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Lacking, Needing, and Wanting 
 
  In this paper I offer a novel conception of the nature of wanting. According to it, wanting 
is simply lacking something one needs. Lacking has no direct connection to goodness but 
needing does, and that is how goodness figures in to wanting. What a thing needs derives from 
what it is to be a good thing of its kind. In people, wanting is connected to both knowledge and 
choice, since a person can know that she wants something and can act on that knowledge. When 
she does, she is acting in light of that want and her want is a reason why she acted. But while 
wanting is thus connected to our rational capacity for action, wanting is not itself a capacity or a 
disposition to act, and it does not cause or generate the action. Acting in light of a want is no 
different from acting in light of any other fact. Still, there is a close connection between wanting 
and our wills, not just because we can sometimes choose how to get what we need, but because 
our choices can determine what we want. We can’t simply choose to want something, but in 
deciding how to live our lives, who to be, and what to pursue, we are free to settle what we want, 
at least within limits. These connections to knowledge and the will make human wanting rich 
and morally relevant, but they don’t transform human wanting into something special. Wanting 
is everywhere just a matter of lacking something one needs. That, in very broad strokes, is the 
picture I will spell out.  
I anticipate two immediate objections. First, don’t needs and wants come apart? Can’t a 
person want something (e.g., another scoop of ice cream) without needing it and need something 
(e.g., exercise) without wanting it? Second, aren’t our wants transparent to us in a way that our 
needs are not? We often know what we want, but we don’t always know what we need. We can 
think we need something when we don’t, and not realise that we need something when we do. 
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Don’t these objections show that wanting something just cannot be the same as lacking 
something one needs? Don’t they show that my proposal is doomed from the start? 
I think my view can offer plausible answers to these objections, answers that cast new 
light on the notoriously dark links between wanting, choice, deliberation, and self-knowledge. 
Here, briefly, are five points we need to keep in mind. First, our wants can differ along many 
dimensions. They can vary in urgency from slight to pressing to dire; they can have a wide 
variety of sources; and it is sometimes a matter of choice how to fill them. We can choose 
another scoop of ice cream, not to satisfy a pressing biological necessity, but just because 
everybody needs a little joy at times and ice cream can do the trick. Second, our needs and wants 
can conflict in complex ways. We can want to exercise to stay healthy and also want to not 
exercise in order to finish a book manuscript. Third, we are not always pleased by our wants. We 
can wish we didn’t want something knowing full well that we do. Fourth, familiar conversational 
factors affect how we say what we and others want and need.1 We may say we don’t want to 
exercise, meaning only that we wish we didn’t need to. And we may say we merely want ice 
cream, so as not to exaggerate its urgency or importance. Fifth, we are understandably most 
interested in those wants we know we have. They can be a reason for action, and we make sense 
of others in terms of the wants (we think) they take themselves to have. Recognising our special 
interest in known wants should not obscure the fact that we are sometimes mistaken or ignorant 
about what we want.  
Crucially, none of this requires denying that wanting is anything but lacking something 
needed. These quick remarks can only gesture at some of the resources my view has to address 
 
1 For an excellent discussion of this, see (Gregory 2017b). 
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these objections. A full response would take us beyond this paper, but I hope that what follows 
makes this view of wanting seem plausible and makes good on the claim that it casts interesting 
new light on wanting, knowledge, and the will. I also recognise that some will say that our words 
‘want’ and ‘desire’ are polysemous and that, at most, I am drawing attention to one use of them. 
I feel some attraction to this myself, but I also think that there is value in seeing just how far we 
can get in understanding deliberation, choice and action if we start with a simple and clear view 
of wanting.  
It will help to make explicit how my view contrasts with standard ones in the literature. 
In general, standard views hold that wanting is a psychological or mental state whose 
“hallmark…is that it moves us to act.” (Marks 1987). I reject both strands in this view. First, I 
deny that wanting is an inherently mental or psychological state or condition. On my view, it has 
none of the characteristic marks of the mental. It is not intentional (Searle 1983), it is not a 
representation of a need (Stampe 1987), or an appearance of a good (Oddie 2017, Tenenbaum 
2007), or an awareness of reasons in favour of doing something (Scanlon 2000; Milona & 
Schroeder 2019). Nor is wanting a sort of judgment or belief (Gregory 2012 and 2017). It is not 
essentially self-conscious and does not invariably involve emotions or passions. Second, I deny 
that wanting has a special connection to motivation. Wanting something is not intrinsically 
motivating (Schapiro 2009), a cause of intentional actions (Armstrong 1968, Davidson 1963), a 
behavioural disposition (Stalnaker 1984, Smith 1994, Alvarez 2017), or a form of action itself 
(Thompson 2008). Wanting is just lacking something one needs. When you know you want 
something, you can act on that knowledge. But this is no different than acting on any other fact. 
Still, I agree with proponents of the standard view that a person’s wants are of 
fundamental importance in her practical life. But their importance is dependent, it seems to me, 
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on knowledge and the will. The path of self-discovery is in part a matter of learning more about 
what we need and want. As we choose the flow and form of our lives, we shape our wants, at 
least within limits that derive from what we ought to want, and ultimately from how we ought to 
be. These connections to knowledge, deliberation, and choice ground what is distinctive and 
special in human wanting. But to understand this correctly, it seems to me, we do best to think of 
wanting as just lacking something one needs.  
Here is my plan. In section 1, I will develop the basic idea and discuss how goodness fits 
in. In section 2, I will defend the idea that wanting is not an essentially mental or psychological 
condition. In section 3, I will consider knowing what one wants and what is involved in acting on 
this knowledge. In section 4, I will look at how our will can influence what we want and at the 
limits to this influence.  
 
1.  Wanting, Lacking, and Needing 
My focus will be on wanting, but as Graham Oddie notes, we have a very rich vocabulary 
for saying and characterising our wants.  
I take desire and want to be synonyms that denote what might be called a thin 
concept, a determinable of which there are various thick determinates. We have 
quite a rich vocabulary for different determinates of desire: crave, hanker, 
yearn, wish, hunger, long, and fancy, among others. There are also closely 
related concepts, such as like and love, that may involve desire, although it is 
not immediately clear that they are just determinates of desire. They may, 
however be concrete realizations of desire. That is, they may be constituted by 
desire together with additional features. (Oddie 2017, 30) 
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Craving and hankering involve an urgency missing from fancying and wishing.2 Longing and 
yearning seem more passive than hungering, though all three involve feeling. Liking, caring 
about, and loving seem to differ in stability or centrality. My likes can shift more easily than my 
loves. The connections between these various things need more exploring than I can give them. 
Importantly, though, all of them seem to involve self-awareness. Ordinarily, one can’t fancy, 
crave, long for, love, or prefer one thing to another without knowing about it.3 I think our 
 
2 Cravings and hankerings are like urges in having a phenomenology. We feel their pull or push, 
even when we prefer not to be moved by them. It may be a terminological matter whether to call 
such cravings and urges “desires”. Harry Frankfurt called them our “most elementary desires”. 
(Frankfurt 2002, 184). But I think it is better to treat these feelings separately from wanting. I can 
want something without feeling a craving for it, and crave something I don’t want. For more on 
this, and on what a theory of desire is a theory of, see (Schapiro 2014). 
3 Love and other deep commitments are of central importance in understanding human life, but 
as Oddie notes these commitments are also very sophisticated, crucially involving not just self-
knowledge but choice. My love for my family, my chosen profession, and even my hobbies can 
give rise to needs and thereby to what I argue are wants. But it is a mistake, I think, to see loving 
as a form of wanting, even as a sophisticated form of it. I don’t have space to develop this point, 
and anyway my interest here is in detailing a conception of wanting. My thinking about love is 
deeply influenced by Harry Frankfurt’s work, especially his (1982).    
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knowledge of our wants is of central importance in understanding human life and action, but I 
think it is best to start with wanting itself. I’ll return to self-knowledge in section 3.4  
Oddie decides to focus on “desiring”, but I will focus on “wanting”. As Dennis Stampe 
notes, the word “desire” is ‘an awkward verb, but a natural noun’ (Stampe 1986, 168). In its 
natural use as a noun, “desire” is familiarly ambiguous between what a person desires and their 
desiring it. While it is fairly easy to distinguish a desire from its object, it is also easy to be lured 
into thinking of desires as themselves object-like, as entities that can have semantic, 
phenomenological, normative and even causal properties. The same temptation arises with 
“belief”, and I warn about it in other work (Hunter 2018; Forthcoming). I think we must resist 
the temptation to hypostasize believing and desiring if we are ever to understand their natures. 
Unlike “desire”, the word “want” is most naturally used as a verb, and does not so easily give 
rise to those temptations, and that is why I will focus on it.  
The idea that wanting is lacking something needed fits the original meaning of the 
English word “want.” The Universal OED says that a want is a “deficiency, shortage, or lack of 
 
4 Oddie might have added preferring one thing to another to his list, in the sense of assigning a 
greater value or expected value. This notion plays a central role in formal decision theory. It 
seems to me that it is not the same as wanting. I may believe that one umbrella is much better 
than another, and so prefer the first to the second, without wanting either one. And I may (or so I 
will argue) want something without knowing it, and so without having any relevant preferences 
regarding it. Preferring seems to involve knowledge in ways that wanting does not. 
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something desirable or necessary”.5 It offers “Victorian houses which are in want of repair” as an 
example. Webster’s defines the verb “to want” as to be needy or destitute, and offers “The motor 
wants a tune-up”, while the OED offers “The wheel wants greasing”. Both dictionaries trace the 
word back to the Old Norse word “vanta”, similar they say to the Old English word “wan”, both 
of which they say mean deficiency. My account of wanting is inspired by these linguistic points, 
but they are not meant to be an argument in favour of it. I think the value of my view of wanting 
comes from the new and interesting light it sheds on the connections between wanting, willing, 
knowing and acting. 
According to the OED, the original notion of “want” was extended early on from lack to 
need. But lacking something and needing it are not the same. A thing can lack something it does 
not need. A clean set of gears, for instance, lacks dirt but does not need any. And a thing can 
continue to need something even after it has got some of it. A set of gears still needs oil even 
after it has been thoroughly oiled, though it may not need more oil, or it may not need any at the 
moment. I will understand lacking as a simple matter of not having.  
 LACK: X lacks Y if X does not have (or is not) Y 
It is the notion of needing that will do the interesting work on my account.  
 
5 This use of “want” to ascribe an unmet need to something is noted by T.F. Daveney, who offers 
“Peter wants a new coat” as an example of it (Daveney 1961). Daveney says that a person can 
want something without knowing it. Rather than focus on it, though, Daveney’s article concerns 
wanting to do what one is intentionally doing, and the connections between this want and the 
action’s causes. As he notes, we characteristically know about such wants. The presence of this 
self-knowledge, it seems to me, indicates that this sort of case of wanting is not fundamental.  
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It seems to me that what a thing needs depends on the sort of thing it is.6 There are 
different sorts of things, different sortal properties. Being a pebble is a sortal property, because 
pebbles are a sort of thing. So are the properties of being a chair, being a person, and being a 
solar eclipse. Some sortal properties are goodness fixing and others are not. All I mean is that for 
some sortals there is such a thing as being a good or better case or instance of it. I assume that 
being a pebble is not a goodness fixing sortal property, for no pebble is a better pebble than 
another. Likewise, being a puddle, being a cloud, being a stain, and being a galaxy are not 
goodness fixing sortals. No galaxy is a better galaxy than any other. By contrast, being a knife is 
a goodness fixing sortal because one knife can be a better knife than another. The same is so for 
other artefactual sortals, such as being a chair, being a pen, and being a gear shift. With such 
artefacts, the goodness is a matter of something like proper function or operation. One knife is a 
better knife than another if it is better at doing what knives are meant to do. What it takes to be a 
good knife is set or fixed by what knives are for.  
A thing can fall under different sortals, and one might be goodness fixing while another is 
not. A knife is also an object, but no object is a better object than another. Being an object is not 
a goodness fixing sortal. A thing can also fall under many goodness fixing sortals, and it might 
be a good thing of one kind but not of another. A knife can be a good paper weight but a poor 
knife. A pebble can be a very good paperweight even if it cannot be a good pebble. So in asking 
whether a thing is good in this attributive sense we need to specify a sortal under which it falls.  
 
6 What follows relies on the discussion of goodness in (Thomson 2008). Her views can be traced 
back to (Anscombe 1958), (Geach 1956), and (von Wright 1963). 
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With living things matters are more complex. I take it that there is such a thing as good 
condition for a rose bush, and that one rose bush might be in better condition than another. In this 
sense, one rose bush may be healthier than another. Health in a rose bush is in some ways like 
but in other ways unlike health in a pine tree or an orchid, and this is why each species has its 
own characteristic needs. What constitutes being healthy is set by the biological nature of the 
plant. Animals also have standards for health, and they too vary from species to species. Unlike 
plants, though, animals have emotional lives, and a battered dog suffering through emotional 
pain is not fully healthy. Emotional life varies from species to species and so do emotional needs. 
Activities, jobs, and tasks are sortals and some of these are goodness fixing. Rolling 
down a hill is an activity, I suppose, but there is no such thing as a better or worse rolling down a 
hill. Likewise for moving through the air. Photosynthesizing, on the other hand, is a goodness 
fixing activity sortal. Some plant species are better at photosynthesizing than others. They do it 
more efficiently or in a wider variety of conditions. I take it that some beavers are better than 
others at chewing though bark and at constructing lodges. So those tasks are goodness fixing 
sortals too.7 People have jobs and these jobs usually set a standard of goodness, of what it takes 
to do the job well. I’ll say more about people in sections 3 and 4 when I discuss knowledge and 
choice. But for now I want to stay with relatively simple cases.   
 
7 Though some act-types are goodness-fixing sortals, being an action is not. No particular action 
is a better action than any other. I am inclined to think it follows that no agent is a better agent 
than any other, either. Of course, one agent might be a better person than another, or a better 
parent, or a better tennis player, or etc., but this would not make them a better agent. I won’t 
pursue this here.   
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I suggest we accept the following.  
NEED: X needs Y only if X is an S and a good S is or has X. 
I will mention some complexities that I will set aside. One is that we can distinguish instrumental 
from constitutive needs. A knife needs to be sharp and it needs to be properly stored.  Being 
sharp is a constitutive need, part of what it is for a knife to be a good one. Being properly stored 
is an instrumental one, something it needs in order to satisfy a constitutive need. A rose bush 
needs a strong root system to be healthy and it needs to be in well-drained soil in order to absorb 
the nutrients it needs. The first is a constitutive need, the other is an instrumental one. I’m not 
sure how to define this difference, and I am sure it is a blurry line. I don’t think these things will 
matter for what I want to say here about wanting.  
Another complexity is that attributive goodness comes in degrees. One knife might be a 
much better knife than another; one rose might be much healthier than another; one dog might be 
much happier than another. Likewise, needs also come in degrees. A geranium plant needs water 
more than it needs nighttime darkness. But it needs both, as it can’t be healthy without either 
one. Dogs need food more than they need social contact with other dogs, but they need both 
things. An instrumental need might also be more urgent than a constitutive one. Getting clear on 
all of this is complex and the details won’t matter in what follows.   
I have formulated NEED as a necessary condition. One reason for this concerns our 
power of choice. Suppose that Susan decides to be an assassin. There are things one needs to be a 
good assassin. A powerful and compact weapon, perhaps. But what if Susan ought not to be an 
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assassin?8 In that case, it seems to me, Susan might not actually need the things that a good 
assassin needs, or at least not need them in virtue of being an assassin. That’s why I formulated 
NEED as only a necessary condition. I think this is a very important point and I’ll return to it in 
section 4. 
 Consider now the following.  
  WANT*: For X to want* Y is for X to lack Y and to need Y.  
The thirsty geranium needs water and lacks it. So the geranium wants* water. Its wanting* water 
consists in the combination of its needing water to be a healthy geranium and its lacking water. 
Likewise, the rusting gear wants* oil because it needs oil and it lacks it. Its wanting* oil consists 
in the combination of its lacking oil and its needing oil to operate well. My knife needs to be 
sharp but it does not want* sharpness because it is already sharp. It does not want* sharpness 
because one of the two conditions needed for its wanting* sharpness is absent. The rose bush 
lacks arsenic, but it does not want* it because it does not need it. Wanting* is simply a matter of 
lacking something that is needed to be a good thing of some kind or other. 
People lack things they need and so have wants*. A drowning person wants* oxygen; a 
hungry person wants* food. For a person to want* something is just for her to lack it and need it. 
Of course the things a person wants* are much more complex than the things that knives and 
rose bushes want*, but that is only because people are much more complex. Human health is 
 
8 The point is not restricted to people. Suppose that Fido is a trained fighter dog, and that a good 
fighter dog is vicious and easily provoked. And suppose that to remain vicious and easily 
provoked Fido needs to be regularly abused. None of this entails that Fido needs to be regularly 
abused, because after all Fido ought not to be a fighter dog.  
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more complex than rose health, and there are many things that people need to have, get, and do 
to be and remain healthy. Our emotional health is also complex, giving rise to a variety of 
emotional and social needs. Humans also have a variety of roles and occupations, each of which 
can give rise to needs and, if what is needed is lacking, wants*. Parents want* certain things in 
virtue of being parents, and teachers want* certain things in virtue of being teachers. Because 
people fall under many sortals at any one time, people have complex collections of wants*. (And 
these differ along a variety of dimensions of stability, urgency, and importance.) Still, none of 
this shows that wanting* in people is any different than wanting* in knives and Victorian 
windows. In every case, the sort of thing that makes it true of some person that she has a want* is 
what makes it true of some knife or plant that it has a want*. In every case, wanting* is just a 
matter of lacking something needed. 
Here now is my account of wanting. 
 WANT: For X to want Y is for X to want* Y. 
According to WANT, wanting just is wanting*. I know many will object that there is much more 
to human wants than wants*. I agree that to understand the full phenomena of human wanting, 
we need to attend to aspects of us that are missing from knives, plants, and some other animals. 
Unlike knives and gears, we have feelings, we can know that we want* things, we can act on our 
wants, and what we want is to some extent a matter of choice. Our capacities to feel, know, and 
choose make a difference to how we experience our wants and, more importantly, to what we 
can and do want. But the fact that we have the capacities does not, I think, make any difference 
to what makes it true of a person that she wants something. In every case, wanting is just a 
matter of lacking something one needs. That, anyway, is the view I think we should explore. 
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2. Wanting and psychology 
 If the dictionaries are right that windows, motors and wheels can want things, then 
wanting is not invariably a psychological state or condition. For windows, gears and plants don’t 
have psychological states. The wheel’s wanting grease would be, I suppose, a mechanical 
condition. The rose’s wanting water would be a biological one. There would be nothing 
essentially psychological or mental about wanting. For there is nothing psychological or mental 
about either lacking or needing. This may seem like a radical doctrine. But I think it is not so 
radical as it might sound. For a lot of what seems psychological or mental about human wanting 
has to do, or so I will suggest, with feelings, knowledge, and the will. I’ll discuss feelings at the 
end of this section, and knowledge and the will in sections 3 and 4. But first, it is worth making 
clear why wanting* something is not a mental or psychological state. Doing this will force us to 
consider why we think that wanting is. 
There are different views about what marks a state as psychological or mental. One is that 
psychological states are intentional or representational. There are different ways to flesh out this 
idea. One might say that Jones’ belief that the 504 stops at Garden Avenue is about the 504 
streetcar and about Garden Avenue, or that it true or false depending on whether the 504 does 
indeed stop there, or that believing is a relation to a proposition that is by its very nature a 
representation. Analogous claims are sometimes made about wanting: that a person’s desires are 
representations of objects and features of the world, that a want is satisfied just in case some state 
of affairs obtains, or that wanting is a relation to a proposition, that of wanting it to be true. Here 
is how Dennis Stampe puts this analogy.  
The satisfaction of a desire is to the desire the same thing as the truth of a belief 
is to the belief. It is a purely semantic property. It is nothing more than the truth 
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of the proposition expressed by the complement of a sentence ascribing the 
desire, or the belief, to someone or something. It is the truth of p in the schema 
S wants it to be the case that p—just as the truth of a belief is the truth of p in 
the schema S believes it to be the case that p. (Stampe 1987, 151) 
Just as a person who believes something is right just in case the proposition that individuates 
their belief is true, so a person who wants something is satisfied just in case the proposition that 
individuates their desire is true. 
I’ll return in a moment to wanting, but it is clear that wanting* is not intentional or 
representational in any of these senses. The wheel’s wanting* grease is not about grease, and is 
neither true nor false nor correct nor incorrect depending on whether some fact obtains, and 
wanting* grease is not a relation to a proposition. The wheel’s wanting* grease consists in its 
needing and lacking grease, but lacking and needing are not intentional or representational states. 
The same is true when a drowning person wants* air. Her wanting* it is not a representation of 
air. So wanting* is not intentional or representational in these senses. It lacks this mark of the 
mental. 
In other work, I have argued against this representational view of believing (Hunter, 
forthcoming). I have suggested, instead, that to believe something is to be correct or incorrect 
depending on how things are. Still, on my view, belief states can be individuated by propositions. 
That is, believing that p is believing that q just in case the proposition that p is the proposition 
that q. But being individuated by a proposition is not enough to make a state a mental one. For 
states of wanting* can also be individuated by propositions. If Stampe is right that wanting is 
always wanting some state of affairs to obtain, then the same is true of wanting. The wheel that 
lacks the grease it needs wants* it to be the case that it has grease. That want* is filled or 
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satisfied when the proposition that the wheel has grease becomes true. The drowning person who 
lacks the air she needs wants* it to be the case that she has air. That want* is filled or satisfied 
when the proposition that the person has air becomes true. And these wants* can be individuated 
by the associated proposition. Wanting* X is the same as wanting* Y just in case any proposition 
whose becoming true would satisfy the first would also satisfy the other. But, as we have seen, 
there is no sense in which needing and lacking are mental. So being a state individuated by a 
proposition cannot be sufficient for being a mental state. 
I am happy to count believing a mental or psychological state, even though I deny that 
belief states are representational. And I am certain that wanting* is neither psychological nor 
intentional. Wanting* is just lacking something needed, and it is hard to see how this can be 
psychological or mental. But what should we say about wanting? If I am right that being 
individuated by a proposition is not enough to make a state representational, then this may allow 
us to say that wanting is also not representational. But if it not representational, then we need 
another reason to think it is psychological.9  
 
9 It might seem that wanting is intensional and even hyper-intensional, and that this both 
distinguishes it from wanting* and makes it essentially mental. Odysseus, after all, seems to 
want to marry Jocasta but not to marry his mother, even though she is his mother. And Emily, it 
seems, wants Santa to bring her a red sleigh. These are hard cases. All of them involve a deep 
confusion or error that is hard to understand. Odysseus is confused about who is who, and Emily 
is mistaken about what things there are. These confusions and errors make their cases hard to 
make sense of. Moreover, in all such cases, the person believes that he or she wants the thing, 
and a person can mistakenly believe she wants something. Odysseus thinks he does not want to 
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Psychological states are often taken to have a distinctive connection with action. At the 
very least, psychological states are supposed to make a difference to what a thing is likely to 
intentionally do. If so, then wanting* is unlike psychological states in that way. To start, 
wanting* is not a disposition or a capacity. Lacking something is not a disposition or capacity, 
and neither is needing something. The fact that a wheel needs greasing is not a dispositional fact 
about it. No doubt the wheel has a variety of dispositions and capacities. But its needing grease is 
not one of them. Wants* are conditions, like being tall, or being old, or being in Toronto, or 
being well-groomed. None of these is a dispositional state, and neither is wanting*. 
Moreover, a thing can have a want* without being able to do anything to satisfy it. A dull 
knife can’t do anything to sharpen itself. A dry gear cannot do anything to oil itself. This is not, I 
think, because knives and gears can’t do things. Knives can cut things and gears can turn things, 
so I am inclined to think that knives and gears can act. But they are not able to do things to 
satisfy their wants*. In this sense, wants* are not intrinsically motivating states. Wants* are not 
states that prompt or incline a thing to do something to satisfy them. 
Living things are different from knives in this respect. Living things are able to do things 
to satisfy certain wants*. A sunflower can move itself to get the light it needs. In doing so, it acts 
to satisfy a want*. Living things have various mechanisms that help them get some of the things 
 
marry his mother and Emily thinks she wants Santa to bring her a red sleigh. As I will argue in 
section 3, we can explain a person’s thoughts, actions, and feelings in terms of false beliefs about 
what they want, without needing to ascribe to them the apparent want. I suggest we not base a 
general account of wanting on cases that are hard to understand and that seem to essentially 
involve self-consciousness.   
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they need. Here too, though, the sunflower’s wanting* light is not a dispositional fact about it. Its 
wanting* light is just its lacking needed light. When a thing acts to satisfy a want* the action is 
not an exercise of that want*. To be sure, the sunflower exercises a power when it moves to the 
light, but that power or ability is not a want*. When it moves to the light, the sunflower is 
exercising an ability it has whose exercise satisfies that want*. But it is not exercising that want*. 
In this sense, wants* are not intrinsically motivational or active states. 
When a sunflower moves because it wants* light, does that want* cause the motion? 
Views on the nature of causation differ, and there is disagreement about whether conditions and 
states can be causes. This debate arises for beliefs and other admittedly psychological states as 
much as it does for wanting*. But however that debate gets settled, it will remain true that a 
want* might play no causal role at all in the activity of a capacity whose exercise satisfies that 
want*. It may be, of course, that the sunflower’s wanting* light triggers the exercise of its ability 
to move. Perhaps the capacity is sensitive to the want*. But perhaps the sunflower’s movement is 
triggered by a distinct condition that happily coincides with the sunflower’s wanting* light. Or 
maybe the power is constantly exercised and it is a happy coincidence that its exercise satisfies 
the plant’s want*. I don’t think anything about the want* itself will settle whether it triggers the 
power or not. For there is nothing in the very nature of lacking something one needs that could 
trigger a capacity whose exercise would satisfy it. This is so even for an infant’s instinctive 
actions aimed at getting milk. Its reaching and suckling will satisfy the want*, and the origin of 
those activities as the exercise of innate capacities may be explained by the presence of the 
want*, but we should not identify the innate ability or its exercise with the want* itself. The 
want* is one sort of thing (a condition), the ability is another (a power or capacity), and the 
exercise is a third (an event or process). The wanting* is just lacking something that is needed. 
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Unlike plants, people and others animals can act in the knowledge of a want, and this adds 
rational complexity to the story. I’ll say more about this in section 3 after discussing knowledge.  
Some psychological states have a phenomenological component. Hunger, thirst, and 
toothache have characteristic feels. And I am happy to count those feelings as psychological or 
mental. Some wants* may have associated feelings, but not all do. Plants have no feelings, I take 
it, but they have wants*. A person who wants* water might feel thirst, but apparently that feeling 
will disappear after a while. The feeling of thirst is a sign of wanting* water, but the want* and 
the feeling can each occur without the other. That feeling is not the wanting*. Alleviating the 
feeling of thirst is not the same as satisfying the want*. And of course some wants* are not 
associated with any characteristic feeling at all. A person may want* more protein than she is 
getting, but there is no characteristic feeling associated with that want*.10  
Let me take stock. I have been detailing how wants* differ from psychological states and 
conditions. They are not intentional or representational, not even in the thin sense of being about 
things and properties. Wants* do not have correctness conditions, though they can be satisfied. 
 
10 William Alston (Alston 1973, 402) traces the idea that wanting is a feeling or passion to a 
cluster of early-modern ideas: a Rationalist conviction that states of consciousness are more 
easily known than bodily ones and an Empiricist rejection of Aristotelian metaphysics. Add to 
these the hope that we might explain rational action in terms of conscious analogues for the mass 
and force that explain the motions of physical bodies, and we get the view of wanting as a 
conscious feeling that works with believing to propel rational bodily movements. This view of 
wanting retains power, even as we have abandoned the views and explanatory ambitions that 
prompted it.   
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Wants* are not intrinsically connected to action. They are neither dispositions nor capacities. 
And they do not all have characteristic phenomenology. Perhaps none of this is surprising. 
Wanting* is just lacking something one needs, and surely no one is tempted to count this a 
mental or psychological condition. But if WANT is true--if wanting just is wanting*--then wants 
too are not psychological states. This would be a surprising result. Most philosophers have taken 
human wants and desires to be fundamentally different from the wants* of knives and 
sunflowers. I suggest, though, that the differences derive, not from the nature of our wanting, but 
from the fact that we can know what we want and can influence what we want through our 
choices and decisions. It is knowledge and choice that make us special, not our wants.  
 
3. Wanting and knowing 
If the dictionaries are right, then wanting is not an essentially self-conscious state. Plants, 
windows, and gears want things without knowing that they do, and indeed without knowing 
anything at all. In suggesting that a thing’s wants are not self-conscious, I don’t mean that they 
are unconscious or subconscious. I mean that they are, like facts about its height and weight, 
non-conscious. Still, people commonly know some of the things they want and knowing this 
makes a difference to what they do. This section explores the connections between wanting, 
knowledge, and action. For elegance, I’ll dispense with the asterisks, and assume that wanting 
just is lacking something one needs. My strategy is to reveal how rich and relevant a person’s 
knowledge of her wants, so understood, can be.  
I take it that people can want something without knowing it, and that it is not always easy 
to know what one wants. This is unsurprising if knowing that one wants something is knowing 
that one needs it and lacks it. Consider our basic biological needs. A person can be protein-
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deficient without knowing it. Sarah might not realise that she needs more protein, and it might 
not be easy for her to find this out. Our bodies are complex and it has taken humans a long time 
to gain the knowledge we have of what it takes to be healthy. As we discover more about our 
biological needs, we gain a better understanding of our biological wants.  
More generally, if wanting is lacking something one needs, then knowing what one wants 
requires knowing something about goodness. One needs to know that one falls under a sortal that 
sets a standard for goodness that one does not quite meet. The biological example illustrates how 
difficult knowing this can be. The same is true of most sortals. It is hard to know what it is to be 
a good father, to be a good streetcar driver, to make a good cake. Some work is usually needed to 
figure out how to do well at even the simplest roles, jobs and tasks. Plausibly, this is so for every 
interesting goodness fixing sortal under which a person can fall. What it takes to be good is 
almost never transparent to us.11  
I also take it that people can be mistaken about what they want. They can think they want 
something when they really don’t. This fact too is unsurprising if wanting is just lacking 
something one needs. For one can be wrong about what one lacks. Naveen may believe she lacks 
vitamin D when, as a matter of fact, her vitamin D levels are fine. She is right that she needs it, 
but wrong that she lacks it. Likewise, a person can be wrong about what she needs. Roberta may 
incorrectly think she needs more arsenic in her diet to be healthy. She’s right that she lacks it, but 
 
11 The way to answer the question “Do I want (to do) X?” is to consider whether you have some 
unmet need that (doing) X would likely satisfy. You can’t answer this just by inspecting your 
conscious mental states.  
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wrong that she needs it. Like Naveen, Roberta thinks she wants something when, in truth, she 
does not. At least not if wanting is lacking something one needs.12 
A person who knows or thinks she wants something might try to get it. It is not essential 
to wanting, though, that a thing will try to get what it wants. Windows and gears can’t ever try to 
get what they want. But many hold that, at least with people, wanting is tightly linked with 
action. Anscombe said that, for people anyway, “the primitive sign of wanting is trying to get” 
(Anscombe 1953). This suggests something like the following. 
DISPOSITION: A person who wants something is disposed to try to get it. 
No one would accept this without qualifications. A plausible version would admit that people 
prioritise their wants, can want conflicting things, and can decide to ignore a want. Anyone 
tempted to connect wanting with trying-to-get would defend a more sophisticated account than 
DISPOSITION. Still, the idea of a tight link between wanting and trying-to-get informs virtually 
every contemporary account of wanting.  
 
12 Utilitarianism tends to blur the distinction between what a person wants and what she thinks 
she wants. Getting something is satisfying if one thinks one wants it, regardless of whether one 
actually does want it. If the goal of morality is to maximize human satisfaction, then it is what 
people think they want that matters. This blurring is encouraged by skepticism about whether 
people can ever be wrong in thinking they want something, and this skepticism in turn is 
supported by a broadly liberal view that doubts whether there are objective human needs. All of 
this, obviously, is beyond the scope of this paper. My thoughts here are influenced by (O’Neill 
1989).  
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But if wanting is just lacking something one needs, then DISPOSITION is on the wrong 
track altogether. If I am right, there is no deep link between wanting and trying to get, even when 
it comes to people. For wanting is just lacking something one needs, but lacking something is not 
a disposition and neither is needing it. Sarah may want protein in her diet, without having the 
slighted disposition to get any at all. She may have no clue that she wants it. As Ryle might have 
said, DISPOSITION involves a category mistake, if wanting is just lacking something one needs. 
A slight revision to Anscombe’s remark might seem to be closer to the truth: “the 
primitive sign of knowing that you want something is trying to get it.” I agree that a person who 
knows that she wants something may try to get it. Sarah might eat some steak in order to get the 
protein she knows she wants. And the fact that she is trying to get it can be, for us, a sign that she 
believes that she wants it. If we know her to be reliable on such matters, it may even be evidence 
that she knows that she wants it. Maybe this revision is closer to what Anscombe had in mind. 
Her concern in Intention was, in part anyway, with the place of knowledge in intentional action 
and, more specifically, with the place of self-knowledge. Knowledge of what one wants fits that 
bill. 
It anyway seems clear that when a person acts intentionally to get something that she 
wants she is acting on her knowledge that she wants it.13 This is central to Carl Hempel’s 
influential account of rational action. 
 
13 John Hyman (1999) argues that an explanation that specifies a person’s reason for doing 
something is true only if the person knows the fact that is her reason. If this view is right, then 
“Susan ate the steak because she wanted to get some protein” is true only if Susan knew she 
wanted to get some protein.  
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[M]any rational explanations present an agent as rationally determined by 
considerations which presumably the agent took consciously into account in 
making his decision. Let us say that a person is a consciously rational agent (at 
a certain time) if (at that time) his actions are rational relative to those of his 
objectives and beliefs which he consciously takes into account in arriving at his 
decisions. (Hempel 1961, 21)   
The role of this knowledge in intentional action is easily missed. When Sarah eats the steak, the 
role of her wanting is clear. It sets the goal her eating steak is meant to achieve. The role of her 
instrumental beliefs is also clear. She is eating steak because she knows (or anyway believes) 
that eating steak is a way to get protein. More generally, she is doing something that she believes 
will get her what she wants. But implicit in this explanation is the assumption that she also 
knows (or anyway has a belief about) what she wants. More recently, Michael Smith puts this 
assumption by saying that when a person acts intentionally she must “put together” her want and 
her means-end beliefs (Smith 1994, 92).14 In eating the steak, Sarah is putting together her desire 
for protein and her belief that she can get some by eating steak. She can put them together only 
because she knows (or anyway believes) that she wants protein. She is thus acting in the 
 
14 My discussion is indebted to (Schueler 2009). He argues that a person’s intentional actions are 
best explained by her beliefs about her desires and wants together with means-ends beliefs about 
how to satisfy them. The desires themselves play no essential role in explaining or motivating the 
action. Schueler does not, so far as I can see, connect this view of action explanation to the 
present account of wanting as lacking something one needs.  
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knowledge that she wants protein. What she did was rational and intentional only because she 
acted in the knowledge of what she wanted. 
What is involved in acting in the knowledge that one wants something? Plausibly, acting 
intentionally is always acting on some knowledge. One is doing what they believe would, in a 
world as they believe it to be, be an effective means to getting what they believe they want. 
Some of this believing must amount to knowledge, or so I will assume. In this respect, acting on 
the fact that one wants something is just like acting on any fact. Sarah knows that she wants 
protein and she knows that eating steak is a way to get some. In eating the steak, she was acting 
on both facts. She acted in light of them both. Both were considerations whose role in her 
deliberation make her eating the steak intelligible. When a person acts to get something she 
knows she wants, the fact that she wants it is among her reasons for the action.15  
 
15 Not everything a person does to satisfy a want is intentional. We blink our eyes without 
knowing why, that is, without knowing the need it fills or even how it fills that need. We may 
also know we have a want without realising we also have a capacity (innate or acquired) whose 
operation will satisfy it. The capacity’s exercise won’t then be intentional and may catch us by 
surprise. All of this is true of more intelligent behaviour, too. Think of complex social 
interactions involving verbal activity. We may come to know why we engage in them and how 
the specific forms they take serve the needs they do. But it comes with being a living thing that 
we have and acquire capacities whose natural exercise satisfies certain of our wants without our 
knowledge. Gaining this self-knowledge may make room for choice, which I will discuss in 
section 4. 
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What I have said about knowledge and action also helps to clarify the role of wanting in 
practical reasoning. As Stampe notes, when we deliberate about what to do, we reason from both 
our beliefs and our wants, but their roles seem different.  
When we reason from our beliefs it is from what we believe—the objects of 
our beliefs—that we reason: the facts as we believe them to be…. Our beliefs, 
then, comprise reasons for us to act through their objects. But when we reason 
from our desires, it is not from what we want that we reason. Desires, then, 
cannot, in that sense, comprise reasons for acting through their objects. How 
then can they do so? How can practical reasoning possibly begin in desire? 
(Stampe 1987, 336-7; italics in original) 
When Sarah wants some protein, the object of her want is protein or her having some. But if 
Stampe is right that a reason must be a fact, neither protein (the stuff) nor having some protein (a 
condition) is in the right ontological category to be a reason for action. Stampe and others 
respond to this by insisting that the objects of desires must be importantly like the objects of 
belief. But the observation that intentional action always involves knowing (or anyway 
believing) that one wants something suggests a simpler idea: practical reasoning starts, not in 
wanting something, but in knowing or believing that one wants something. It can start there even 
if the objects of wants are not the right sort of things to be reasons.16 
 
16 Stampe says that it “will not do to make practical reasoning begin from the proposition that 
one wants a certain thing: that would be nothing more than reasoning about one’s desires.” 
(347). I agree with him (and Anscombe) that “kinds of reasoning are not distinguished by their 
subject matter” (347). But that is because reasoning about the facts is the only reasoning there is. 
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This is not to deny that a person’s wants have a special role to play in practical reasoning 
and intentional action. When a person acts to get something they want, the fact that they want it 
sets a goal for the action. In acting they aim, inter alia, to satisfy the want. Sarah’s knowledge 
(or belief) that she wants protein thus sets a goal for the action. By contrast, her knowledge that 
eating steak is a way to get protein does not set the goal of the action, at least not its ultimate 
goal. All of this deserves more attention than I can give it here. But it is worth stressing the point 
that acting on a want is just like acting on any other fact. This is so even if the want sets the goal 
for the action. 
Some theorists say that a person does something intentionally only if they want to be 
doing it, and that this marks a distinctive sense or form of wanting.17 It is distinctive in part 
because the object of the wanting is an action type. Sarah wants to be eating protein, and this is 
different from wanting protein. I’m not sure how best to accommodate this on my view, in part 
because intentional action always involves knowledge and choice. When Sarah eats steak in 
order to get some protein, she knows she is eating it, and she knows she is eating it in order to 
get the protein she knows she needs. She knows that eating the steak will fill a need she knows 
she has. Assuming that she is not being coerced, she is eating it voluntarily, and it is because she 
chose steak that she is eating it rather than chicken or tofu. I’m not sure what is meant to be 
added to the description by saying that Sarah also wants to be eating the steak. It would be odd to 
add that Sarah might not want to be eating it, but isn’t this because she is knowingly and 
 
Facts about what we want are one sort of fact and it is not surprising that they are of central 
concern to us when we reason about what to do. My views are influenced by (Thomson 1962). 
17 See, for instance, (Schueler 1995) and (Schapiro 2021). 
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voluntarily doing something that she chose to do? To deny that she wants to be doing it would, it 
seems to me, be to suggest that she does not really knows what she’s doing, or is being coerced 
into it, or didn’t choose the means she is taking. All of this make me question whether such cases 
really do require us to recognize a distinctive form of wanting.  
On my account, practical reasoning can start from knowledge of a want. Stampe thinks 
there is a difficulty in an account of practical reasoning that involves only belief and knowledge.  
Starting from It would be good if p, and perhaps Only my doing A will make it 
the case that p, by what logic do we pass to I will do A? All that seems to 
follow is that It would be good to do A—and this neither denotes an action nor 
the content of an intention; further premises would yield I ought to do A, but to 
believe that is not to intend to do A. We confront a logical gap. And it cannot, 
it seems, be bridged by the addition of further beliefs. (Stampe 1987, 339; 
italics in original) 
Practical reasoning, he says, must conclude “by force of some sort of logic” (ibid, op. cit.) in an 
intention or action. Aristotle, he remarks, put this by saying that the intellect itself moves 
nothing. I think I see the gap Stampe has in mind. A person who concludes that she really ought 
to do A might never do it and never even intend to do it. Such a person may have some 
explaining to do, but what do we, as theorists of practical reasoning and wanting, have to 
explain? This is not the place to explore the root springs of action. I am not persuaded that 
intentional action requires a force of logic. And even if it did, it is unclear to me why wanting 
something could do the job but knowing that you want it not. In any case, these matters will have 
to wait for another occasion.  
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I said that a revision to Anscombe’s remark may get closer to the truth: “the primitive 
sign of knowing that you want something is trying to get it.” But it would be wrong to think this 
supports the following revision to DISPOSITION.  
DISPOSITIONK: A person who knows she wants something is disposed to try to 
get it. 
It is true that a person who knows that she wants something might try to get it. That is one way to 
respond to the fact that she wants it. But a person might instead respond to that fact by trying to 
eliminate the want. She might decide that the costs involved in satisfying the want are too great 
and instead take steps to remove the need altogether. My case of Sarah and the protein can’t 
illustrate this, since her biological need for protein is not under her control. There is nothing she 
can do to remove that need. But here is another case. Sarah is a soccer coach and she knows that 
she lacks the training she needs to be a good one. But she also knows that the required training 
would fill her weekends and interfere with her family life. She knows that, qua soccer coach, she 
wants more training, and she knows that completing the courses would satisfy that want. Instead, 
though, Sarah decides to quit being a soccer coach. Quitting coaching is also an intelligible 
response to that want. This suggests that knowing that one wants something is best viewed as 
dispositionally neutral. Neither the wanting nor the knowledge of the want are intrinsically tied 
to any disposition.  
This is relevant to a connection Stampe draws between wanting and reason. He says that 
wanting has a per se authority: wanting something is in itself a reason to try to get it. (Stampe 
1987, 344) If wanting is lacking something you need, then it is not surprising that wanting 
something can be a reason to try to get it. But Stampe overstates the authority of wanting, if he 
means that wanting only ever constitutes a reason to try to get. For it depends on whether the 
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relevant need is removable. If it cannot be removed—as with some biological needs—then the 
wanting has the per se authority Stampe identifies. If it cannot be removed, then wanting it is a 
reason to try to get it. But if the relevant need is removable, then while the wanting remains a 
reason for action, it is no more a reason to satisfy the want than it is a reason to eliminate it.18 I’ll 
return to this in the next section when I discuss choice.  
But before I get to that, I want to discuss what is involved when a person believes they 
want something when, as a matter of fact, they neither need nor lack it. We can start by 
considering how people say what they want.  It seems right to understand sentences like the 
following as expressing beliefs. 
I want more protein. 
I want more coach training. 
I want a new computer. 
That is, in saying such a thing, a person is speaking the truth just in case what they have 
identified (protein, training, a computer) is something they need and lack. Assuming their 
assertion is sincere, the person believes what they say. But the person may be wrong in what she 
 
18 It is another matter entirely, though, whether she ought to try to get it. This depends on 
whether other considerations outweigh the fact that she wants it. Other needs may always be 
more urgent. And it may be that she ought to respond to the fact that she wants it, not by trying 
to fill the lack, but by trying to remove the need. 
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believes. Saying that one wants something does not entail that one does want it, and neither does 
believing that one wants it.19  
 This is important to keep in mind when we consider cases where a person acts in order to 
get something they say or believe they want. We must not assume that they want it just because 
they say or believe they do. As Fred Schueler has argued, we can often offer a perfectly good 
explanation of a person’s action without assuming that they do want what they say or think they 
want (Schueler 2009). Suppose we see Sarah carrying a new computer to the shop counter. When 
asked, she tells us that she wants a new computer because hers has broken. Let’s suppose that 
she does need one for her work. But let’s also suppose that she does not actually lack one. 
Perhaps she is wrong that her current machine is broken. Or perhaps unbeknownst to Sarah, her 
wife has already bought her a new one as a surprise. Sarah believes she needs and lacks a 
computer, but she is mistaken about this. It seems to me that to make sense of her actions, we 
don’t need to say she really does want a new computer. It is enough to say that she thinks she 
does. She may insist she wants one when we ask, though when we tell her about her wife she 
may reply that she thought she wanted one. (She will likely say she mistakenly thought she 
lacked one.) And it is very familiar that we can explain a person’s actions by ascribing mistaken 
beliefs to them. Suppose the box Sarah is carrying is mislabeled and contains a fax machine not a 
computer. We could still explain her action by noting that she mistakenly believed the box 
contained a computer. Just how ascriptions of error can help explain what people do needs more 
discussion than I can give it. And no doubt such explanations succeed only in cases where people 
 
19 There may be some wants that a person can have only if she knows that she does. I’ll return to 
this in the next section.  
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are mostly right about other things, including about other things they want. My point here is just 
that ascribing to someone false beliefs about what they want when explaining their actions 
introduces nothing new and should not be overlooked in an account of action explanation.  
 I have tried in this section to bring out how rich and relevant a person’s knowledge of her 
wants can be and the role such knowledge can play in intentional action and practical reasoning. 
I don’t think there is anything very new in these observations. But I think it is worth noting that 
none of them forces us to view wanting as anything other than lacking something one needs. 
What a person wants makes a difference to what she intentionally does. But it makes this 
difference through her knowledge of those wants.   
 
4. Wanting and Choosing 
On my view, what a person wants depends on which sortals they fall under. In some 
cases, a person has no choice whether she falls under a given sortal. People are human beings, 
and this is not a matter of choice. As a result, those of a person’s wants that derive from basic 
bodily needs are not voluntary. She may try to get what she wants, or she may ignore it, but she 
cannot remove it. But some sortals are voluntary in that a person can decide or choose whether to 
fall under them. In these cases, because the person typically knows what she decided, she also 
knows something about what she subsequently wants in virtue of that decision. This section 
explores these connections between choosing and wanting and notes an important limit to them.  
As I noted in section 1, jobs, activities, and tasks can be goodness fixing sortals, and they 
can be voluntary. Sarah chose to be a soccer coach, and Jones decided on a career as a streetcar 
driver. Those are both goodness-fixing sortals, since there is such a thing as being a better or 
worse soccer coach or streetcar driver. And a person can lack what is needed for being good in 
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that role or job. Sarah doesn’t have enough free time to do the training required to be a good 
coach, and she knows this.  Jones lacks the patience her job requires, and she knows this, which 
is why she is taking courses in customer relations. Roles and jobs can be more or less voluntary 
and people sometimes have very little choice in the matter. Most people have to have some job, 
and the wants that derive from that fact may be only minimally voluntary.  
Activities can be voluntary and give rise to wants. Henry decided to be a cyclist, and 
there are things a person needs to be a good cyclist, even if only a moderately good weekend-
cyclist. As a result, he wants better cycling shoes, a better diet to maintain his fitness level, and 
more endurance for the hill climbing. He also knows it will be more enjoyable to have a higher-
end seat, so he wants one, even though he doesn’t need it as much as he needs the shoes. He 
didn’t realise he also wanted to carry spare inner tubes and he learned this the hard way. Some of 
what Henry needs as a cyclist depends on the nature of cycling itself, on what is needed for a 
bicycle to be good, but some depends on his own nature, on what he finds pleasurable. And these 
wants vary in strength. The more he learns about the activity and about himself the better he’ll 
understand his cycling wants. He knows all of this and can act accordingly. 
Specific tasks can be also voluntary and give rise to wants. Simon decided to make a 
chocolate cake for dessert. The recipe calls for both baking soda and baking powder, neither of 
which he had, so he wanted to go to the store to get some. He also decided to beat the eggs 
separately by hand. He knew he didn’t need to do this, but his recipe recommended it and he 
enjoys it, so he wanted to. Here too we see the subtle variation in strength in a person wants, and 
how what a person wants can derive both from the nature of the task itself and their own nature.  
These cases also illustrate how for some sortals one cannot fall under them without 
knowing it and without knowing something about the relevant goodness fixing standards. You 
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can’t be a cyclist and not know it. Henry knows he is a cyclist because he decided to be one. 
Before making this decision, he knew something about what it takes to be a good cyclist and to 
enjoy the activity. You can’t be making a chocolate cake and not know it, and least not if you are 
intentionally making it. Simon knows that he is making a chocolate cake because he decided to 
make one. Before making this decision, he knew something about how to do it well. Neither 
Henry nor Simon directly decided to want something—you cannot decide to need or lack a thing. 
But in deciding to be a cyclist or a cake-maker each of them in effect generated wants, some of 
which they knew about in advance and some of which they then needed to figure out.  
In this way, what a person wants can be a matter of her choice. There is an important 
limit to this, though, deriving from the fact that a person can fall under a sortal that she ought not 
to. Here is an example from section 1. Susan is an assassin and a good assassin needs a weapon. 
Suppose that Susan lacks one. Does it follow that she wants one? Susan, we may suppose, 
believes that she wants one, but as we have seen this does not entail that she does want one. 
Suppose that Susan ought not to be an assassin. And suppose that she ought not to have a 
weapon. In that case, it seems to me, there are two things we might say about whether she wants 
one. The options differ over how they conceive of the link between sortals and needs. 
First, we might say that a thing’s needs are fixed by its actual sortals, that is, those sortals 
that it as a matter of fact falls under. Because Susan is an assassin, she would then need 
everything needed to be a good one. Whether Susan ought to be an assassin would be irrelevant. 
We would then need to say that Susan needs something (a weapon) that she ought not to have. It 
is not just that she thinks she needs it. On this way of connecting needs and sortals, Susan really 
does need a weapon even though she ought not to have one.  
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Here is an alternative. We might instead say that a thing’s needs are fixed by its permitted 
sortals, that is, those of its actual sortals it is permitted to fall under. Susan would then need 
everything it takes to be a good assassin only if she is permitted to be an assassin. Merely being 
an assassin would not be enough. If she is not permitted to be an assassin, then she may not need 
a weapon at all, depending on whether having a weapon is needed by one of her permitted 
sortals. If not, then while she may think she needs a weapon, she’d be wrong. And if she doesn’t 
need a weapon, then she does not want one either, even though she believes she does. She would 
then be mistaken about both what she wants and what she needs.  
I am not sure how to decide between these two ways of speaking. I suspect the decision is 
purely a terminological one. But the second way of speaking helpfully reveals one more source 
for a potential gap between what a person might say and think she wants and what she actually 
wants. We saw in section 3 that a person can be ignorant or mistaken in ordinary ways about 
what she lacks and needs. Naveen is right that she needs Vitamin D but wrong that she lacks it. 
Her mistake is a familiar factual one. Sarah is wrong that she needs arsenic, but right that she 
lacks it. Her mistake is a normative one, in that it is about what human health requires. Susan’s 
case suggests a different source for such error. She is wrong, not about what she lacks or about 
what it takes to be a good assassin, but about whether she is permitted to be an assassin. This 
mistake grounds a mistake about what she needs and wants. She is wrong about what she wants 
because she is wrong about who and what she should be. 
Being a person is a goodness-fixing sortal. This means there are things a person may 
want in order to be a good person, and such wants are non-voluntary since one cannot decide 
whether to be a person. I won’t try to make a list. But I want to note how knowledge and choice 
take on special relevance here. Knowing what one needs to be a good person is elusive in a way 
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that knowing what one needs to be a healthy person or a good soccer coach or a good baker are 
not. Figuring out how to be a good person is not as hard as knowing how to be healthy. But it is 
harder than knowing how to be good at a task or activity we voluntarily set ourselves. We can’t 
decide not to be a person. But there is room, I think, for each of us to decide for ourselves what it 
is to be a good one and in deciding this we can come to know what we want. This freedom is part 
of what it is to be a person, though there are limits here too. All of this is obviously best set aside 
for later, but I think the idea I have defended here—that what a thing wants depends on what is 
needed for it to be a good thing of its kind—can help us understand this freedom and those 
limits.  
A final point. The cases I have discussed are simple and idealised, which made them 
useful for drawing out the main points of my account of wanting, but may leave the impression 
that my account is impoverished. I think, though, that it has the resources to understand the full 
richness of a person’s practical life. It can allow that people, in addition to being human beings, 
have a great variety of needs stemming from their natures, roles, jobs, and tasks, with each of 
them grounding a large spectrum of wants of differing degrees of urgency and importance. 
Conflict among a person’s actual wants is inevitable and all too common, and ignorance and 
error about our wants only add to this complexity, as does our ability to decide who to be and 
what to do. That we can know what we want makes rational action possible, and that we can 
choose who to be makes our wants and actions morally relevant.  It seems to me that we can best 
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understand this richness if we start with the simple idea that wanting is just lacking something 
one needs.20  
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